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FOREWORD

WHY SCHOOLING IS SO CONTROVERSIAL IN
AMERICA TODAY
JOHN

A.

H.

ROBINSON*

Our Existential Dilemma

To live in the twentieth century for most of us is simultaneously to inhabit two different thought worlds. Two competing ways of making sense of human life vie for hegemony
over our hearts and minds; all of us have to find some way or
another to reconcile the conflicting claims of the two. There
is nothing uniquely modern about this: Philo Judaeus and
Paul of Tarsus, each in his own way, mediated the conflict
between Hebraic and Hellenic thought in their works; Augustine and Aquinas were themselves both masters of synthesis, as were Descartes and Kant. For us, however, the straddling act required by our dual citizenship is particularly
anguishing.
Should we see the universe as the gift of a loving creator
or as the chance product of mindless forces? Should we see
humankind as the summit of physical creation or as a mere
way station in the evolutionary process? Should we conceive
of the choices that we make as constitutive of our character
and as determinative of our eternal destiny or as illusions to
be transcended as we come to understand the psychic, somatic, and social factors that determine human behavior? Is
death the point of transition from this life to an afterlife of
infinite duration and unutterable bliss (or unimaginable pain),
or is it simply the moment of extinction of consciousness and
nothing more? Should we perceive our fellow humans as
brothers and sisters with whom we are called to form an abiding and effective community, or are they, like us, so many
rational hedonists, competing with us for the scarce goods of
the earth? Are our values mere rationalizations of idiosyn* Assistant Professor of Law and Philosophy and Director, Thos. J.
White Center on Law & Government, Notre Dame Law School.
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cratic preference and social position, or are they manifestations of a divinely ordained human nature, deviation from
which will guarantee our personal diminution and perhaps
our eternal damnation?
Pascal gave one sort of answer to these questions;
Voltaire, another. From Hume to Russell, most British philosophers sided with Voltaire; following Kant, continental
philosophers were suspicious of glib dismissal of the Pascalian
side. All of them, however, took the questions themselves to
be intelligible and important. Early in this century, philosophers were inclined to dismiss the questions as symptomatic
of conceptual confusion and therefore as not worth answering. That the philosophers' "demonstrations" succeeded in
establishing their claim is very much open to doubt, but it is
beyond doubt that they did not succeed in disabusing the rest
of us of our belief that these basic questions demand answers
of us and that the answers Wqe give define the kind of persons
that we are.
As we attempt to formulate answers to these questions,
we discover, I believe, a systematic split between the sort of
answer that what might loosely be described as the religious
thought-world provides, on the one hand, and the one that
what may with equal looseness be described as the scientific
thought-world provides on the other. The former is the
world of a providential creator, an immortal soul, eternal reward or damnation, free will, and meaningful action. The latter is the world of blind forces, determined behavior, relentless materialism, and the quantification of everything. The
life-blood of the religious thought-world is faith; that of the
scientific one is doubt. Religious claims respond to our demand for meaning, scientific claims respond to our demand
for explanation-the former denoting a more affective demand; the latter, a more cerebral one.
We, of course, want both the comfort of meaning and
the brilliance of explanation. We value both the will to believe and the acid of skepticism. We are heirs to our religious
tradition and, often, participants in scientific pursuits. We
vary, therefore, in our ability to reconcile the different kinds
of answer provided by the different worlds that we inhabit,
just as we differ in the way we deal with whatever residual
conflict remains after our effort at reconciliation is complete.
For some of us the conflict is starkly unreconcilable; we then
either live a kind of cognitive schizophrenia or simply
subordinate one thought world to the other. For others of us,
'the conflict is wholly illusory; we then attempt one of several
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"best of both worlds" syntheses, with what success it is difficult to say. For the rest of us, the answers that we give to
questions of ultimate meaning reflect neither perfect reconciliation of the claims of the two worlds nor complete subordination of one to the other, leaving us, if not schizophrenic,
at least tentative and not a little confused. In any case our
efforts in this regard constitute, so to speak, natural sacraments: they effect what they signify in their capacity both to
express what we are and to influence what we become.
B.

The Constitutionalization of Family and School

As congenital pragmatists, Americans are inclined both
to discount and to displace ultimate questions. As a result we
do not confront them head on. We encounter them instead
slightly disguised in other contexts. One of those contexts is,
I believe, the schooling of our children. Questions about
schooling bring to the surface both conflicts among ourselves
as to what answers should be given to ultimate questions and
conflicts within ourselves over the adequacy of the truce we
have struck between the warring claims that the two thoughtworlds have made for our allegiance. The first sort of conflict
is politically divisive; the second is psychologically stressful. In
a culture within which one thought-world had established
complete dominance over the other, the political conflict
would disappear, and for a person in whom a similar dominance was established, the psychological tension would be
eliminated. I do not doubt the possibility of either occurrence, but it is my sense that ours is not such a culture and
that by and large we are not such persons. Both politically
and psychologically we are torn between the conflicting
claims that the two worlds make on us. This alone accounts
for the duration and the vehemence of the schooling debates
that are the focal point of this issue of our Journal.
By the peculiar alchemy of American life, political conflicts over time become constitutional questions, even when
there is not a phrase in the Constitution that explicitly addresses the conflict at hand. So it is that when periodically
the issue is joined between "scientific" schoolers and "religious" resisters, it is in the language of constitutional law that
the issue is framed, addressed, and resolved. The text of the
Constitution contributes something to this alchemy, viz., the
non-establishment and free exercise language of the first
amendment and the liberty interest that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment is said to protect. While
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oceans of ink have been spilled in efforts to interpret the first
and fourteenth amendments, those two provisions simply
don't address the two institutions that are at the heart of
most schooling debates, viz., the family, on the one hand, and
the state educational bureaucracy, on the other. On those
two institutions the American Constitution is simply silent. As
to both, however, a whole corpus of constitutional jurisprudence has emerged in the past century, and it is that body of
law that sets the context for the disputes that we will examine
in this symposium.
1. Constitutional Family Law
With the possible exception of the churches, whose privileged position is guaranteed by the first amendment, no social institution can compete with the family for respect in
American constitutional law. During the generation-long
struggle against Mormon polygamy of the last century, the
United States Supreme Court celebrated the monogamous
family as "the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble
in our civilization" 1 and as a bulwark against patriarchal despotism.2 During the subsequent Substantive Due Process era,
the Court again upheld the monogamous family as a guarantor against the kind of meddling despotism that the Court
found in Plato's Republic8 and, we can surmise, that it saw in
the process of formation in the Soviet Union. It was the state
education bureaucracy, trying in one case to subvert disfavored ethnic loyalty" and in another to frustrate unpopular
religious indoctrination, that was the loser in the Substantive
Due Process cases, and the clear message was that parents
have priority over the state when it comes to deciding with
what beliefs children are to be inculcated during their formative years.
Because this message was based more on distrust of the
meddlesome state than on trust in parental wisdom, it was
impossible to predict how the New Deal Court, which thoroughly repudiated the anti-statist views of its predecessor,
would resolve conflicts between family values and the agenda
of the state educational establishment. Initially the New Deal
1. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
2. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879).
3. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
4. Id.
5. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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Court sided with the state,6 but in the greatest volte-face of its
history, it subsequently sided firmly with the family in such
disputes." Even in the rare case where the state was allowed
to overrule a parental decision as to the best interest of a
child,' the Court viewed the so-called parens patriae power of
the state with great suspicion.'
While the bureaucratic state has made enormous advances in the generation since the New Deal cases were decided, the Court has remained amazingly consistent in its
preference for the family over the state when it comes to deciding who shall decide what is in the best interest of the
child. Natural parents are preferred to foster parents;"0 the
home is preferred to the reform school;" the parental decision to institutionalize a child is exempted from judicial review;" very strong evidence is required before a state can
terminate parental rights;13 and the Amish, at least, can take
their adolescent children out of school when they, the parents, think best, not when the state educational bureaucracy
says so." What is so striking about all of these cases is that
they are so redolent with suspicion of the allegedly benevolent state. When the state educational establishment seeks "to
'save' a child from himself or his Amish parents," 5 it has an
enemy in, of all places, the United States Supreme Court.
2.

Constitutional Education Law

To say that the school is subordinate to the family in
American constitutional theory is not to say that the school
itself, or the bureaucracy that controls it, lacks constitutional
6. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
7. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
8. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
9. Id. at 171. In addition to the constraints on parens patriae power
that were stated in Prince, the Court has subsequently taken "great care to
confine Prince to a narrow scope. . . ." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
230 (1972) (referring to the Court's reading of Prince in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
10. Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
11. I infer this from a reading of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970). Those three cases, taken together, make it very difficult for even
the benevolent state to take children from the custody of their parents for
the purpose of subjecting them to the discipline of a reform school.
12. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
13. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
14. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
15. Id. at 232.
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status in its own right. Nothing could be further from the
truth. Even when the Court was inveighing most heavily
against the oppressive bureaucrat, it carefully distinguished
between the meddlesomeness that it proscribed and the reasonable regulation of the educational component of child
rearing that it left unscathed by its fulminations. In Meyer v.
Nebraska, for example, Justice McReynolds, the ultimate antistatist, said, "The power of the State to compel attendance at
some school and to make reasonable regulations for all
schools . . . is not questioned. Nor has challenge been made
of the State's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions
which it supports. Those matters are not within the present
controversy." 6 He repeated the same caveat in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, his other landmark opinion on the limits of the state
when it conflicts with parental schooling preferences."
In the New Deal Court's withering critique of the "village tyrants"1 whom it assimilated to Nero, Torquemada,
Stalin, and Hitler 19 in their efforts to achieve "uniformity of
sentiment"2 by coercive means, it blithely acknowledged that
"the State may 'require teaching by instruction and study of
all in our history and in the structure and organization of our
government, including the guarantees of civil liberty, which
tend to inspire patriotism and love of country.' "2 When, finally, the Burger Court exempted Amish children from some
provisions of Wisconsin's compulsory attendance laws, that
Court, like its predecessors, expressed "no doubt as to the
power of a State, having a high responsibility for the education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the
control and duration of basic education. '"22
The preceding parade of quotations proves, I think, that
even when the education establishment has been rebuffed in
its efforts to overrule parents as to the schooling of a particular child, its legitimacy has received constitutional acknowledgement. But it is not only as an officious intermeddler in
family value transmission that the school bureaucracy has
come to the Court's attention. At other times it is seen by the
16.
17.
18.

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638

(1943).
19.
20.
21.
586, 604
22.

Id. at 641.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 631. (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
(Stone, J., dissenting) (1940)).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
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Court as a vital cog in the machinery by which the upward
mobility of the underclass is made more probable. In Brown
v. Board of Education,23 for example, Chief Justice Warren described education as "a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. ' 4 And in Plyler v. Doe, 5 Justice Brennan said
that "education provides the basic tools by which individuals
might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us
all." ' 26 Implicit in these observations is the suggestion that,
because education is so valuable, the bureaucracy that makes
education available to the underclass by way of the public
school system deserves a certain amount of deference just so
long as it does not discriminate within the population that it
is supposed to serve.
Ultimately, however, it is not the socio-economic benefits
that flow from universal education that ground the constitutional status of the education bureaucracy and of the system
that they run. It is the political contribution of education in
general and of schooling in particular that provides that
grounding. That contribution can best be understood, I
think, as having two basic components. The first is eminently
practical and utterly non-controversial; the other one is both
more rarefied and more subject to debate. It is, however, that
latter component that is absolutely essential to an adequate
consideration of the several articles that make up this symposium issue of our Journal; so we still have to consider it with
some care.
The non-controversial component of the political contribution of education to American life is simply the basic literacy that it conveys. Literate voters are, ceteris paribus, better
voters than are illiterate voters, if only because the former
are in a better position to survey and assess the information
on which elections ought to be decided. Experience teaches
that this is not a reason to deny the vote to the illiterate; literacy tests are subject to abuse and the illiterate may display
uncommon political wisdom in the electoral choices that they
make. 2 The preferability of literacy in an electoral democ23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. Id. at 493.
25. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
26. Id. at 221.
27. Literacy tests are not per se unconstitutional; see Lassiter v.
Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). They are, however, so
susceptible to abuse that they are now widely disfavored. See Louisiana v.
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racy is, however, a very good reason for making the illiterate
literate, and, insofar as this is what schooling does, schooling
makes a valuable political contribution to American life. Insofar as schooling goes beyond mere literacy and provides students with the factual information and analytic skills that are
useful in making intelligent political decisions, it multiplies
the political benefits that flow from mere literacy and further
secures for itself a privileged position in the constitutional
scheme of things.
The controversial component of the contribution of education to American political life relates to the habits of mind
that education is thought to encourage. It is comforting to
think, as Justice Jackson did in Barnette, that public schools,
"faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and political neutrality," 8 can be mere conduits of knowledge, but it is also
foolish to think this way. Two developments in constitutional
theory were required before the folly of Jackson's conduit account of schooling could be fully appreciated and before the
habits of mind component could emerge with perfect clarity.
One development pertains to the speech and press provisions
of the first amendment; the second concerns the application
of first amendment theory to school settings. Together these
two developments conspire to create a constitutional doctrine
of education that subsists in unstable tension with the constitutional family law described earlier in this foreword.
The first development just mentioned is a product of the
thought of Zachariah Chafee 9 and Louis Brandeis. 0 In the
politically repressive years that followed World War One,
they developed a theory of the first amendment according to
which its speech and press provisions were meant both to expose the government to popular scrutiny and to subject it to
popular criticism. But, they reasoned, neither the scrutiny
nor the criticism were self-executing. Neither would occur
unless the people possessed a sense of their own ultimate political power and a further sense of their own political responsibility.31 Put negatively, a passive, uncritical citizenry, which
United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966).
28. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943).
29. See Z. CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920).
30. See his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 372-80.
31. Alexander Meiklejohn, reacting against certain weaknesses that
he perceived in Chafee's theory, made the clearest case for basing speech
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thinks of itself fundamentally as "the governed," is inconsistent with democratic theory. In Brandeis's words, "[T]he
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people . .
. [P]ublic
discussion is a political duty. .. "81 Or, in the words of Ed-

mond Cahn, "The chief enemies of republican freedom are
mental sloth, conformity, bigotry, superstition, credulity, monopoly in the market of ideas, and utter, benighted ignorance." 8 8 In time, the Court came to embrace this position,
and it is now firmly in place as the theoretical substructure of
first amendment law.
The second development referred to above involved the
application of the theory that Chafee and Brandeis had developed to the school setting. This was done primarily by Felix
Frankfurter in the politically repressive years that followed
World War Two. Concurring in an opinion which struck
down one of the many loyalty oath requirements of that era,
Justice Frankfurter said:
That our democracy ultimately rests on public opinion
is a platitude of speech but not a commonplace in action.
Public opinion is the ultimate reliance of our society only if
it be disciplined and responsible. It can be disciplined and
responsible only if habits of open-mindedness and of critical
inquiry are acquired in the formative years of our citizens. The

process of education has naturally enough been the basis of
hope for the perdurance of our democracy on the part of
all our great leaders, from Thomas Jefferson onwards."
From these premises he inferred a privileged place for teachers in the constitutional scheme of things, referring to them
as "the priests of our democracy. '3 5 The fate of that inference need not trouble us here; 6 what is important is that by
his efforts during the worst years of the Red Scare Frankfurter insinuated into the care of constitutional education
and press freedom in the ultimacy of the people as governors in a democracy. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

(1948).

32. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
33. Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L. J. 464, 480
(1956).
34. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
35. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
36. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), Frankfurter dissented
from the Court's application of the theory he had developed in Updegraff.
See id. at 490-96.
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doctrine the claim that there is a profound nexus between
the habits of mind that our schools foster and the success of
democratic government."7 For Frankfurter, it was better to
risk having an occasional subversive loose in the classroom,
bad as that might be, than to permit a "pall of orthodoxy''8
to descend over the classroom. Frankfurter's success consisted in educating the Court to see that from the point of
view of democratic theory, what is wrong with the pall of orthodoxy is that it encourages that inertness, that mental
sloth, that uncritical passivity that are "[t]he chief enemies of
republican freedom." 89
3. Constitutional Doctrines in Conflict
If the sketches of American constitutional family and education law that I have just drawn are at all correct, courts
attempting to use those bodies of law to resolve conflicts between parents and schools over the education of children are
bound to run into trouble. The family law cases present the
state as meddlesome and inept and its operatives as so many
self-deceived childsavers who do more harm than good. The
education law cases present teachers as "the priests of our democracy" and the classroom as a kind of holy place where
children acquire information, social attitudes, and habits of
mind that would in all probability be denied to them if they
were excluded from school. Surely both claims cannot be correct. In fact, neither is correct, and the path of wisdom lies in
seeing wherein both claims go awry.
If Americans are congenitally pragmatists, we are at the
same time hopeless idealists. More than we realize, we deal in
icons and evade realities. So the "family" of our constitutional doctrine is a loving triad in which the parents really do
know what's best for the child, and the "school" is this marvelous agent of Americanization, churning out informed,
open-minded young patriots. The reality is, of course, more
complex. Not only are there bad families and rotten schools,
fanatical parents and authoritarian teachers, schizophrenogenic family dynamics and lobotomizing educational programs, but there is between the family and the school a tension that is quite literally as old as Aeschylus but with which
37. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) for the
posthumous vindication of Frankfurter's position.
38. Id. at 603.
39. Cahn, supra note 33, at 480.
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our law has never come to terms. That tension requires a moment's attention.
Left to itself, the family is self-destructive; it cries out for
completion by an extra-familial community. Even in a healthy
family, children benefit from alternative centers of activity
and from alternative sources of care. It would require skills
that surpass my own to explain how this is true, but it is not
unreasonable to suspect that extra-familial experience curbs
the narcissistic ego-centrism of children while it enhances
both their self-concept and their self-esteem. The former
would flow from their exposure to adults for whom this child
is not the center of their life; the latter, from their interaction with a host of others who don't regard the child as fundamentally their offspring or sibling. Simple release from the
oedipal hothouse of the nuclear family might all by itself be
felt as a boon by a child, as might the deliverance from an
otherwise ineluctable role-as, say, the kid brother-that the
extra-familial world offers. Similar considerations could be
developed regarding the benefit that accrues to parents from
involvement in the broader community.
Left to itself, the state is all-consuming; it needs to be
restrained by a set of intermediate institutions that act as
buffers between it and the individual. Even the well-intentioned state tends to homogenize its citizens, delegitimizing
all loyalties except those that bind the individual to the state.
This, I think, is why both Locke and Mill, those twin pillars
of the modern state, expressed such grave misgivings about
state-sponsored education. Locke took great pains in his Second Treatise of Civil Government to vest the education of children in the hands of their parents, and in Some Thoughts Concerning Education he went so far as to urge the wealthy to
educate their children at home, lest they be corrupted by
their peers even in the most exclusive of schools.40 In his celebrated vindication of the social and political benefits that
flow from leaving people free to decide for themselves how
they should live, Mill dismissively rejected the common
school as a "mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another;" 4 ' he feared that it would establish "a
despotism over the mind."" 2 The family is a natural antidote
to the state's totalitarian tendencies. As does a church, it gen40. See J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION § 70.
41. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 98 (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
42.

Id.

§§ 55-71 and J.
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erates loyalties that rival in intensity those that the state
evokes, and it conveys beliefs that can undermine the ideology that the state is purveying.
In a healthy polity, then, the hypertrophy of both the
family and the state will be prevented, heavily by the restraints that each impose upon the other. This process of mutual restraint will surely generate tensions but it is a tension
that benefits both the general polity and the family and state
that "suffer" from it. Wise constitutional theory would focus
on this healthy tension, and, in vindicating the claims of either the family or the school, it would carefully acknowledge
both their negative potential and their need for the
counterforce provided by the other. Paradoxical as it might
seem, the best thing that can happen to a family is the emergence outside of it of vigorous competitors for the attention
and trust of its children, and the best thing that can happen
to the state is the persistence within it of equally vigorous resistance to its appeals for loyalty and submission. If there is
one pervasive flaw in modern American constitutional family
and education law, it is the insensitivity of both doctrines to
the implications of this apparent paradox. A return to the
cognitive conflicts that I sketched at the outset of this foreword will perhaps clarify the point I am trying to make here.
It will also set the scene for the several articles that follow in
this issue.
C.

Humility and Love

Nothing could be more outrageous than to suggest that
humility and love might be crucial to the solution of basic
public policy problems, but that is the suggestion that I will
make here. Humility is, I think, required relative to the resolution of the existential dilemma that I sketched in the opening paragraphs of this foreword, and love is, I believe,
equally requisite to the resolution of the doctrinal impasse
sketched later on. In making the case for each of these
claims, I will be able, I hope, to merge the two issues that I
have taken up in these preliminary remarks.
The humility that I just mentioned amounts in practice
to an abiding awareness of how puny our minds are with reference to the enormity of the issues posed by questions of
ultimate meaning. Both individually and collectively, we are
no match for these questions. Our purchase on both our religious traditions and on our scientific culture is so weak and so
partial that none of us should presume to be masters of ei-
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ther and almost none of us even pretends to be master of
both. Communication between the two cultures is so rudimentary and so banal that nothing but a kind of rotarian
"good-will" emanates from the rare official encounters between them, and little but confusion emanates from the occasional informal contact between scientists and religionists. As
a result in the four and a half centuries since the emergence
of the Copernican challenge, the interface between science
and religion has more often been a kind of free-fire zone
rather than a hallowed ground.
Humility could change all that. It would bring home to
us how much more we need to know about both religion and
science and how, much deeper our appreciation of the role
that both faith and doubt play in our lives would have to be
before we could begin adequately to answer questions about
apparent conflicts between the two. Humility could turn the
arrogant disdain that the enlightened scientist feels for religion into reverence for the resources of religious consciousness, and it could relax the grip that a blind fear of science
and a consequent rage against its alleged godlessness often
imposes on religious believers. In our dealings with our children, humility might make it possible for us to transmit to
them the awe that we experience in the presence of a power
that eternally eludes comprehension, the comfort that our religious belief brings to us when we confront that power, and
the integrity of scientific pursuits. It might help us to warn
them against the hubris implicit in dismissing one or the
other and against the folly implicit in thinking that they have
mastered the logos that is in principle beyond being mastered.
And love, what could it do? Where parents and the state
vie for the allegiance of children, where each distrusts the
ideology in which the other would steep those children, each
needs to be reminded of the kenotic selflessness that love demands of us. Parents reluctant to expose their children to the
tutelage sponsored by the state may be correct in their suspicions-indeed, according to the articles that follow in this issue, they often are-but they still need to ask themselves if
they are not using their children as pawns in a political struggle that could be fought on other ground. They need also to
ask if their reluctance to expose their children to external
influences is not evidence of a desire to have their children
function as extensions and replications of the parents themselves rather than as persons in their own right. They need,
in short, to see if their natural affection for their children has
matured into genuine love, where the well-being of the be-
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loved takes precedence over the interests of the lover.
Since Marsilius of Padua argued that the state should
limit itself to being a keeper of the peace, 3 any suggestion
that the state should love its citizens has been met with disbelief; as we have seen, the American Supreme Court has been
most suspicious of the state when the state was asserting a
paternal interest in the well-being of the wayward young
within it. 4 It remains true, however, that the state's educational bureaucracy has a duty to love the children who are
under its jurisdiction at least insofar as love requires it to put
their well-being ahead of its own insatiable desire to grow
and to control. A bureaucracy so motivated would surely not
seek to set children against their own parents, and it surely
would seek to help them to reconcile conflicts between their
received beliefs and what is purveyed in the classroom. Its
fundamental interest would not be in sweeping as many children as possible within its schooling network, but in making
sure that every child in its jurisdiction reaped the benefits of
education, however that might be done. Whether this facsimile of love can motivate a bureaucracy is a hard question to
answer, but, if it can, that it should do so is obvious.
If humility and love could be conjoined in both parents
and bureaucrats, then I think the problems I sketched earlier
could be, if not solved, at least brought under control. That
they are not now under control is, I believe, adequately established by the articles that follow. In them Judge Hand and
Steven Lee, in separate articles, address what they take to be
the religious status of secular humanism; they then pursue
the constitutional implications of its status for instruction in
the public schools. Professor John Baker argues the case for
home-schooling, and Paul Blewett addresses the issues raised
by "creation-science" and by cases in which its constitutionality has been debated. Finally, Jennifer Burman explores some
questions involving the insulation of religiously-affiliated
schools from the requirements of federal anti-discrimination
laws.
None of our authors pretends to have the last word on
the question that he or she addresses. Even the terms in
which they couch these questions are in and of themselves
immensely controversial; creation-science is a science only by
the most generous understanding of the criteria by which the
43.
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scientific status of a mode of inquiry is established, 45 and secular humanism can be viewed as a religion only by a similarly
generous understanding of what a religion is. 4 6 But, as I hope
this foreword has shown, each of our authors addresses issues
of great importance and of comparable difficulty. These issues deserve careful attention from the most creative and
sensitive minds in our society. How we resolve them will influence not just the quality of the schooling that the next
generation of our children will receive, but also the tone of
our entire intellectual culture for decades to come. With this
thought in mind, I commend this issue of the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy to the reader in the hope
that you will find the questions that it asks as thought-provoking as I have.

45. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 126769 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
46. See Dent, Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 So. CAL. L. REv.
863, 876-77 (1988).

